Is it worth buying potassium iodide and whether a potential accident at the ZNPP could resemble Chernobyl or Fukushima – nuclear physicist Edwin Lyman

A potential terrorist attack at the Zaporizhzhya NPP could resemble the Fukushima accident rather than Chernobyl. And although the danger of sabotage by the Russian occupying forces at the ZANP is unlikely, the Ukrainian authorities and other states should take care of preparing a plan in case of emergency situations with potential exposure. Edwin Lyman, a nuclear physicist and head of the Nuclear Security Program of the United States Union of Concerned Scientists, believes so.

In an interview with Voice of America Ukrainian Service journalist Maria Prus, he also told how vulnerable ZNPP is to military actions and why, in his opinion, Ukrainians should not panic and buy potassium iodide.

The interview has been edited for clarity and flow.

Maria Prus, VOA: According to the latest statements from Ukrainian intelligence, the Russians are planning a terrorist attack, and it could happen at any minute if the order is given. What do you think is the possibility of this attack and what are the possible consequences?

Edwin Lyman, director of the nuclear security program at the Union of Concerned Scientists: Unfortunately, nuclear power plants are vulnerable to military attacks and sabotage.

So, if there is an organization like the Russian military that wants to stage a provocation at the station and cause a release of radiation, that is certainly within their technical capabilities.

But the question remains, what is the strategic advantage for Russia to do this? These justifications appear to be very limited in substance indeed, and one would wonder why Russia would want to pollute a country it wants to take over, possibly by severely damaging key parts of the economy such as agriculture.

So, I think that’s probably the biggest obstacle to any serious military attack on the Zaporizhia NPP – the consequences and how they might affect both sides.

M.P.: If we talk more broadly about the consequences. There was a lot of discussion about how, say, the Chernobyl nuclear power plant differs from Zaporizhzhia, what safety measures were taken there after the Chernobyl disaster. So if there is a terrorist attack there, what could happen? What are the mechanisms to stop the spread of radiation?

E.L.: ZNPP is less vulnerable than it was a few months ago. Six nuclear reactors are located on the territory. Each of them has its own storage for radioactive waste, so there is a lot of radioactive material in each of the buildings of the reactor shield.

But the reactors themselves are closed and have not produced electricity through nuclear fission for many months or longer. So the heat from the radioactive fission products is reduced, making it easier to cool the reactors and prevent them from melting down.

And besides, this station differs from the design of the Chornobyl NPP and the specific scenario that the Chernobyl disaster led to – this is unlikely to happen in Zaporizhzhia.

These are light water reactors and are not as vulnerable to the type of rapid power increase that caused the Chernobyl explosion. But even so, there are definitely ways in which reactors or spent fuel can be damaged or the containment structures will leak and be damaged.

So there are definitely concerns. And we need to make sure that there is no more damage to the physical infrastructure of the plant, no power outages, there is a supply of cooling water, which is necessary to remove heat from the reactors and spent fuel and prevent them from overheating and melting – this requires a significant effort to ensure the preservation of this infrastructure that is there no military conflict, no explosives that could potentially damage electrical piping systems or physical structure.

M.P.: Yes, regarding the destruction of the Kakhovskaya dam, the Russians claimed that it was destroyed by a Ukrainian missile, and Ukraine insists that it was blown up. So if we are talking about a nuclear power plant, can it be significantly damaged by an accidental missile, and not only by detonation of the territory?

E.L.: As a civilian nuclear power plant, it had no real defense against military attack. And today the Russian military occupies the station. Some reports indicate that they did bring in military equipment, trucks with explosives, that they actually mined the station grounds and possibly some security related facilities like the cooling pond, some of these reports were confirmed, others not.

But there is no doubt that the militarization of the site has made it more vulnerable and is now a legitimate military target for Ukraine, putting the Ukrainians in the position of potentially having to attack their own nuclear power plant to free it from Russian occupation. I think that is the biggest danger

Another concern is sabotage at the station by Russia. Intelligence reports suggest that they have such a plan, and of course they could do it in many different ways, given that they have complete control of the station.

And as you point out, the identification of who blew up the Kakhovka Dam is still not completely over, and so you can see how in the fog of war, one side can continue to claim that it is not guilty, and it is difficult to get conclusive evidence, even if all the signs point to this side as the culprits. So it may be that Russia is planning to take similar action again at the Zaporizhzhia NPP, then deny responsibility and hope that the confusion will prevent the West from actually conclusively proving that they are responsible and avoid further retaliation for many months.

M.P.: How concerned are you about reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency about mining on the territory or around the station? Because at the beginning of the report it was said that the reactors were supposedly safe, but at the same time it mentioned mining. So do you think the international community, international agencies, the UN and others are doing enough to ensure the safety of the power plant?

E.L.: The international community is certainly not doing enough, but there are limits to what it can do because of this situation. I believe that the IAEA went as far as it could go when it brought its personnel to the station where they are on rotation.

And certainly CEO Grossi has shown leadership and courage as he leads some of these missions and continues to call for an agreement that will essentially secure the station and all of the surrounding infrastructure from military attack.

But, unfortunately, these requests still remain unheard. The fact is that the station was militarized by the Russians, so it is difficult to imagine that it could become a demilitarized zone without the retreat of the Russians. So, you know, the international community, I think, is doing a lot, but it’s limited.

What can really be done is simply to increase preparedness for emergencies with potential exposure to surrounding communities both in Ukraine and beyond, to ensure that there is an effective response to protect public health in the worst case scenario.

MP: So do you consider this a real danger for Ukrainians now?

E.L.: The United States State Department recently said no. There, the intelligence does not see any signs of an imminent threat of a Russian attack on the Zaporizhzhya NPP.

And again the question is what will be the motivation? Some said Russia would use this as a scorched earth tactic to prevent or disrupt a Ukrainian counteroffensive, but now the counteroffensive is slow and the Russian military’s deployment of conventional landmines has been effective in slowing Ukraine’s advance. Therefore, in my opinion, there is really no need for Russia to resort to tougher tactics.

That wouldn’t be a very effective military strategy, since you can’t guarantee where that radiation will go. You can have a good understanding of the weather conditions, the timing of the attack, but still there can be surprises, so there is a little bit of unpredictability.

Therefore, it seems less attractive as a military tactic. Therefore, I am still skeptical that this is in the interests of the Russians – unless they retreat and simply want to strike the country and bring as much misery as possible to the Ukrainian people during their retreat, just to do it out of spite. But this, I think, is a very real possibility if the counteroffensive succeeds.

MP: You said that the consequences of sabotage at the station will mostly depend on the weather and other conditions, but what exactly could the consequences be? How will the radiation spread, to which territories, which countries may be affected by it, apart from Ukraine, Russia and nearby states?

E.L.: The consequences of such an attack really depend on how it progresses. How many reactors are involved, how much spent nuclear fuel is affected, whether the containment structures themselves are breached or not, and that can really lead to a wide range of potential consequences again.

Because the reactors are relatively cold, even if cooling is interrupted, there will be more time to intervene to prevent damage to the rods or spent fuel. However, if Russia were to deliberately attempt to sabotage the station, it would likely thwart any attempts to intervene.

I think the most likely outcome will be an event similar to the Fukushima disaster in Japan in 2011. It was a station with six power units that suffered from a terrible natural disaster. But several of these reactors were operating, so there was no time to react, as at the ZNPP, to be able to intervene. But it ultimately led to the accidents of three reactors.

Three protective buildings were destroyed and significant pollution was caused in an area tens of kilometers from the station. So your logical result is likely to be relatively limited compared to what happened at Chernobyl where there was a big explosion and a big chunk of the reactor core itself was vaporized and dispersed into the atmosphere.

I don’t think it’s likely to happen again. But there may be much lower-level pollution for many tens or hundreds of kilometers, which may affect agriculture, make it difficult for people to return to their homes for a long time, and may lead to large clean-up costs.

But (radiation) can also cross borders. I don’t think it will significantly affect most of Europe, but it could be noticeable and will definitely cause international concern about it. Any amount of radiation, however small, that would cross borders as a result of an attack would raise real questions about international law in this regard.

MP: What would you like to advise Ukrainians?

E.L.: I think it’s important not to panic. These concerns have been raised in the past, and I understand that whenever similar situations arise, sometimes people run, they buy potassium iodide. Potassium iodide is a chemical, a drug, that, if taken shortly before or shortly after exposure to radioactive radiation, can prevent the thyroid gland from absorbing this material, which can cause cancer.

But this drug should actually be distributed by emergency responders who have a better idea of ​​how, where and when it should be distributed. So, you know, if people run to the drug store and buy it themselves, it can cause a shortage, and there may not be enough for the people who might really need it.

So I would caution that there is always a fine line between worry and panic. But I think you can still be aware, be concerned, but listen to the authorities and respond to what they say rather than trying to act on your own because that can only make things worse for others.