“I don’t want to cause pain” – writer Elizabeth Gilbert canceled the publication of her new book at the request of Ukrainian readers

Koshini Rooftop Bar offers local wine and stunning views of Tbilisi. The cocktail-drinking clientele is not fashionable local youth, but Russians.

“People here see a difference between the Russian government and the people,” said Aleksabd Klabukov, 30, from St. Petersburg, who arrived here shortly after his country’s troops invaded Ukraine.

“I did not agree with the war,” says Klabukov and adds, “I feel that I am happy here.”

The anti-Russian graffiti covering the streets of Tbilisi tells a more complex story of the relationship between the two countries and peoples. Georgians have reacted ambivalently to the recent influx of Russians like Klabukov, reflecting the country’s general perception of Russia.

The warming of relations between the ruling party “Georgian Dream” and Moscow stands in stark contrast to the steadfast pro-Ukrainian sentiment on the streets. Although the Georgian government is adamant about joining the European Union and NATO—goals strongly supported by the majority of Georgians—the government is increasing economic ties with Russia. And analysts and critics say that Georgia is moving away from the dream of the EU.

“We are under enormous pressure and there is a big, big risk of an attack,” says Nikoloz Samkharadze, a member of the “Georgian Dream” MP, explaining his party’s “pragmatic” stance toward the neighboring country. “That’s why we have to walk a very fine line.”

Many critics of the party see things differently. Some also speculate that the founder of Georgian Dream, former prime minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, who made much of his fortune in Russia, is likely to lead the country to Moscow.

The party categorically denies any involvement of Ivanishvili, who formally retired from politics in 2021. “The Georgian government chose the Russian side,” says Giorgiy Vashadze, head of the opposition party “Strategy Builder”. “Georgian Dream” publicly says that they are pro-Western. But their actions are anti-Western and pro-Russian.

Support of Ukraine

Russia’s presence is evident 100 kilometers from the capital, where EU observers help maintain stability. A Russian cargo truck drives down a winding road to the village of Khurvaleti, cut in half by the Kremlin’s previous invasion.

In 2008, Georgia fought and lost a short war that damaged diplomatic relations with Russia. Today, 20% of Georgia’s territory, including half of Khurvaleti, is controlled by Moscow-backed separatists.

Samkharadze from “Georgian Dream” was a teenager during the war. “As a generation that grew up with this, we feel a responsibility to prevent any such scenario,” he says, explaining his party’s cautious stance toward Moscow.

But in the village of Tserovani, where there were thousands of Georgians displaced by that conflict, Nana Chkareuli from South Ossetia draws a different conclusion. She still dreams that her region will eventually return to Georgian rule.

But not thanks to Russia. “Every day we support Ukraine and watch what is happening,” says Chkareuli. “If Ukraine wins, we will have more chances. If not, we will not have a chance.”

Some Russians here also support Kyiv. Approximately 100,000 came to Georgia after the war in Ukraine for business or political reasons. Others arrived in previous years, seeing the country as a safe haven from an increasingly repressive Kremlin.

“Georgia is the center of the community of political émigrés,” says Yehor Kuroptev, who arrived in Tbilisi almost ten years ago. Today, he heads the representative office of the “Free Russia” foundation in the South Caucasus, which supports Russian political emigrants.

Like Klabukov of the Koshini bar, he says the Georgians have mostly been good to them, although relations soured early last year.

When Russian émigrés started joining anti-war demonstrations in Tbilisi, things got better, Kuroptev says.

“Georgians saw that they are not monsters,” he says about Russian immigrants, “they are normal.”

Not everyone shares this opinion. Graffiti on the walls and sidewalks of Tbilisi call on Russians to leave the city, and their leader, Putin, is given colorful nicknames. While Russian immigrants have poured millions into Georgia’s economy, they have also raised prices, causing discontent among locals. In the Black Sea resort of Batumi, high-rise apartment buildings advertise apartments for sale in Russian.

“Many Russians here are pro-Putin,” says Irkali Mirianashvili, an IT specialist from Tbilisi, voicing one popular suspicion. “If there are many of them here, it will be dangerous for Georgia. We are a small country.”

Profits from the war

After the invasion of Ukraine, Russia became one of Georgia’s main trading partners. A February report by Transparency International Georgia said the country earned $3.6 billion in remittances, tourism and exports from Russia last year — triple the amount in 2021.

However, people are more supportive of the separation. A September survey by the American non-profit International Republican Institute showed that most Georgians consider Russia to be the biggest political and economic threat to their country. About half are suspicious of the warming of relations between Tbilisi and Moscow. On the contrary, polls show massive support for joining the EU.

Last year, the EU granted candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, but not to Georgia, setting a dozen conditions that the government must fulfill. Brussels intends to assess Georgia’s progress by the end of this year. Observers doubt that Tbilisi has fulfilled most of the conditions. Instead, recent events suggest that Georgia may be moving in the opposite direction.

In March, thousands of Georgians protested against legislation requiring media and non-governmental groups to register as so-called “agents of foreign influence” if 20% or more of their funds come from foreign sources. The government eventually abandoned the bill, which critics say replicated Russia’s crackdown on civil society.

The resumption of direct flights from Moscow to Tbilisi last month sparked new protests. Samkharadze from “Georgian Dream” says that Moscow intended to “reduce” Georgia’s chances of receiving a candidate for the EU. However, he did not explain why Tbilisi had agreed to the flights, which, as expected, drew criticism from the EU.

“The only thing they care about is staying in power,” Giorgii Melashvili, head of the non-governmental group the European-Georgian Institute, says of the ruling party, which nevertheless remains more popular than the fragmented opposition.

“They will do literally anything to maintain their power over the country, including trying to maintain good relations with Russia,” he adds.

Iraklii Porchhidze, vice president of the Georgian Institute for Strategic Studies in Tbilisi, also describes the ruling party’s actions as an attempt to “hold on to power.”

“Their heart is not with Ukraine, and this could be a strategic mistake,” he says about “Georgian Dream”. This will be especially relevant if Kyiv, supported by the West, wins the war.